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Abstract
The hypothesis that intuition promotes cooperation has attracted considerable atten-
tion. Although key results in this literature have failed to replicate in pre-registered 
studies, recent meta-analyses report an overall effect of intuition on cooperation. 
We address the question with a meta-analysis of 82 cooperation experiments, span-
ning four different types of intuition manipulations—time pressure, cognitive load, 
depletion, and induction—including 29,315 participants in total. We obtain a posi-
tive overall effect of intuition on cooperation, though substantially weaker than 
that reported in prior meta-analyses, and between studies the effect exhibits a high 
degree of systematic variation. We find that this overall effect depends exclusively 
on the inclusion of six experiments featuring emotion-induction manipulations, 
which prompt participants to rely on emotion over reason when making allocation 
decisions. Upon excluding from the total data set experiments featuring this class 
of manipulations, between-study variation in the meta-analysis is reduced substan-
tially—and we observed no statistically discernable effect of intuition on cooper-
ation. Overall, we fail to obtain compelling evidence for the intuitive cooperation 
hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that intuitive decisions drive 
cooperative behavior and that reflective control overrides a cooperative ‘default’ 
behavior to produce selfish decisions (Bear and Rand 2016; Rand et  al. 2014). 
According to the SHH, intuitive decisions tend to rely on experience from games 
encountered in everyday life, where interactions typically are repeated and 
involve opportunities for sanctions; deliberation adjusts behavior to the optimal 
self-interested response in the situation at hand.
The SHH, however, conflicts with suggestions elsewhere in the literature that 
deliberative processing supports pro-social decision making (e.g., Achtziger et al. 
2015; Martinsson et al. 2012; Stevens and Hauser 2004). Moreover, several stud-
ies have failed to find a relationship between pro-social behavior and canonical 
manipulations of cognitive processes (e.g., Hauge et  al. 2016; Tinghög et  al. 
2013, 2016; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester 2014). This includes a recent regis-
tered replication report by Bouwmeester et al. (2017), which sought to replicate 
the keystone time-pressure study in Rand et al. (2012) but did not find an effect 
of time pressure on cooperation. Yet, recent meta-analyses present results consist-
ent with an overall positive effect of intuitive decision processes on cooperation 
(Rand 2016, 2017a, b). In sum, the literature on intuitive cooperation has grown 
sharply since the publication of the original time-pressure study by Rand et  al. 
(2012)—but without reaching a resolution.
This paper presents an updated meta-analysis to add clarity to the litera-
ture. While we obtain an overall meta-analytic effect of the intuition manipula-
tions on cooperation, we can attribute this effect to a specific class of induction 
manipulations. These manipulations ask participants to rely on emotion over rea-
son in determining their resource allocation (Gärtner et  al. 2018; Levine et  al. 
2018). Thus, we identify a single source of variation in the effect size that may 
account for inconsistent conclusions in the literature; when we exclude the six 
experiments that feature this specific manipulation—comprising just 7% of our 
total data set—we obtain no effect of intuition on cooperation, and the exclusion 
also yields a substantial reduction in systematic between-study variation. These 
results are problematic for the SHH as emotion-induction manipulations are vul-
nerable to alternative interpretations—and the SHH gives no reason for favor-
ing this class of manipulations over others. Moreover, the dramatic dissipation of 
systematic heterogeneity, following removal of emotion-induction manipulations, 
runs counter to the idea that the intuitive cooperation effect, if present, is highly 
heterogeneous (Rand 2016). We also note that our results cannot be explained 
by between-study variation in participant compliance rates; we find no evidence 
that studies with higher compliance rates yield systematically higher effect sizes, 
speaking against the claim in Rand (2017a, 2019) that non-compliance explains 
why many studies find no effect of intuition manipulations on cooperation.
Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we present our data set and methods, then 
the analysis, after which we offer concluding remarks on the cognitive founda-
tions of cooperation and the state of the literature.
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2  Data and methods
Our inclusion criteria largely follow those in Rand (2016), who presented a meta-
analysis to examine the effect of intuitive decision making on cooperation. The 
inclusion criteria define relevant experimental games and intuition manipulations. 
To be included in our meta-analysis, a study has to feature a controlled experi-
ment—with monetary incentives and no deception—that used time pressure, cogni-
tive load, ego depletion, or induction to manipulate cooperation.1 The required intui-
tion manipulations follow Rand (2016), exactly.2
As for relevant experimental games, we depart slightly from Rand (2016) by 
focusing on games that capture cooperation in strategic interactions not contami-
nated by past or future choices, to ensure clear interpretation of the dependent vari-
able. Therefore, we include only one-shot, simultaneous-move public goods games 
and prisoner’s dilemmas. This differs from Rand (2016), who in addition to simul-
taneous-move public goods games and prisoner’s dilemmas, also included second-
player moves in sequential trust games and decisions from the last round of finitely 
repeated games. Nevertheless, to gauge how inclusion criteria affect our results, we 
perform robustness checks that also include sequential game decisions. Our final 
data set comprises 44 of 51 experiments included in the prior meta-analysis by Rand 
(2016), as most of his studies fit our inclusion criteria. In addition, we include 36 
new experiments featuring 13,189 participants, an increase of 56.9% in the number 
of studies and an increase of 83.5% in the number of participants.3 Table A.2 in Sup-
plemental Online Material (SOM) A provides a full overview of the experiments 
comprising our data set, including the number of participants and details about game 
type and manipulation used.4
1 Time-pressure studies typically ask participants either to decide within 10  s (time pressure) or to 
spend more than ten seconds on the decision (time delay). Studies with cognitive load ask participants 
to engage in some alternative task, while simultaneously engaging with the main decision problem. The 
idea is that participants will have less cognitive resources available for the main task and will hence 
rely more on their intuition when making a decision. Studies with depletion manipulations present an 
ancillary task prior to the main decision, to tire (‘deplete’) participants in advance of the main decision. 
Finally, induction manipulations ask participants to use their intuition while deciding, to rely on emo-
tions or their ‘heart’ (emotion induction), to read the instructions in a foreign language or, prior to the 
decision, to recall a time in their lives when intuitive decisions paid off (recall induction).
2 See (Myrseth et  al. 2017) for a methodological critique of time-pressure experiments purporting to 
show evidence for ‘intuitive cooperation.’ This meta-analysis does not necessarily endorse the manipula-
tions included; rather, it takes them on faith in an effort to address patterns discussed in the literature.
3 Twenty-one of the experiments in our updated study originate from a recently registered replication 
report (Bouwmeester et al. 2017). Seven of these use time pressure, including: Strømland, et al. (2016), 
Everett et  al. (2017), Isler et  al. (2018), Capraro and Cococcioni (2015), Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani 
(2018), and Bird et al. (2018). We also added Madland (2017), Gärtner et al. (2018), Rand (2018), and 
Tinghög (2018), all of which are unpublished studies manipulating deliberation through a form of induc-
tion. Two field experiments (Artavia-Mora et al. 2017, 2018) do not satisfy the requirement that the study 
involve monetary incentives and were thus not included in our meta-analysis.
4 We used Google Scholar to search for the following keywords in all possible combinations: “prisoner’s 
dilemma” or “public goods game” combined with “cognitive load,” “time pressure,” “ego depletion,” 
“intuition priming,” “intuition recall,” or “intuition conceptual priming.” We also manually searched 
through articles citing (i) the original study by Rand et  al. (2012) and (ii) the meta-analysis by Rand 
(2016).
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Our inclusion decisions depart from Rand (2016) in two additional respects. First, 
our main analysis includes studies that provided in the experimental instructions 
information about time pressure. Rand (2016) argues that this introduces a poten-
tial comprehension confound—however, such challenges are inherent to these kinds 
of experiments regardless of when one introduces information about time pressure. 
Moreover, most of the data using this variation of the time-pressure manipulation 
originate from Tinghög et al. (2013), who successfully solved the issue of compli-
ance plaguing other studies (e.g., Bouwmeester et al. 2017; Rand et al. 2012). For 
these reasons, we do not see adequate justification to exclude studies that, in the 
experimental instructions, inform participants about time pressure.
Second, all of our analyses include participants who did not comply with the 
experimental treatment, as excluding them would lead to selection bias. The mean-
ing of ‘compliance’ depends on the specific manipulation type, and the compliance 
rate varies by type. Compliance is mostly an issue for the time-pressure manipula-
tion (where non-compliance means not responding according to the time constraint) 
and induction manipulations (where non-compliance means that one has failed to 
follow instructions to write down something in an open field). Table A.5, in SOM A, 
displays compliance rates by manipulation type.
In his discussion of time-pressure experiments, Rand (2017a) argues that exclud-
ing non-compliers provides an improved picture of the effect and that such exclu-
sion is justifiable due to the absence of correlation between observable factors and 
compliance with the time constraint. However, a re-analysis of Rand et al. (2014), 
Table A.1 in SOM A, shows that compliant participants are a selected subgroup—
consistent with the argument that compliant-only analyses suffer from selection 
bias (Bouwmeester et  al. 2017; Tinghög et  al. 2013). Moreover, regardless of the 
outcome of balance tests, participants could self-select based on factors unobserv-
able to the researcher. For this reason, we include non-compliers, and so all results 
must be interpreted as an ‘intention-to-treat’ effect. Still, the number of studies and 
participants featured in our meta-analysis allows for high statistical power to detect 
very small hypothesized population effect sizes (see SOM B for a detailed power 
analysis).5
We subject our data set to a random-effects meta-analysis, which allows for sys-
tematic variation between studies by assuming that each true effect is drawn from 
a normal population distribution, with a common mean and between-study vari-
ance (Higgins et  al. 2009).6 This modeling assumption seems reasonable a priori, 
as several papers argue that the effect is heterogeneous (Mischkowski and Glöck-
ner 2016; Rand 2018; Rand et al. 2014; Strømland et al. 2016). In line with Rand 
(2016), we use as our dependent variable percentage contributed of the total endow-
ment, ensuring that our results are directly comparable to those in the previous 
5 See Sect. 3.2 for further discussion on the implications of the compliance issue for our analysis and 
main conclusions.
6 The normality assumption is only necessary for testing the null hypothesis of no mean effect in the 
random-effects distribution of true effects. For purposes of estimation, no distributional assumptions are 
required, and to construct valid confidence intervals, one may rely on asymptotic normality in the num-
ber of studies (Higgins et al. 2009).
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meta-analysis. For decision problems with binary choice, such as the conventional 
prisoner’s dilemma, the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the participant 
cooperates, and 0 otherwise.
Analytically, our study differs from Rand (2016) in that we pay particular atten-
tion to sources of heterogeneity—systematic inconsistency across experiments. 
When there is large systematic inconsistency across experiments, it is hard to inter-
pret the weighted summary effect produced by a meta-analysis.
In our meta-analysis, each effect size is computed as the percentage point dif-
ference between the treatment (intuition condition) and control group (deliberation 
condition). This means that the effect-size measure is bounded between 0 and 100. 
For studies retrieved from Rand (2016), we use reported effect sizes and standard 
errors, directly. For Bouwmeester et al. (2017), we follow the same procedure and 
retrieve the standard errors from the data reported. For other studies not included in 
either of the aforementioned data sets, we retrieved the data from regression tables 
where the percentage point difference between the treatment group and the control 
group was reported, and we normalized the effect size to a scale ranging between 0 
and 100. For studies where this was not possible (e.g., if the main analysis condi-
tioned on participants’ compliance status and the intention-to-treat effect was not 
reported), we downloaded the data and ran linear regressions of the normalized 
contribution rate on a dummy indicator for the intuition condition, using the esti-
mated coefficient as a measure of the treatment effect (this estimator is equivalent to 
a simple mean difference between the intuition condition and the deliberation condi-
tion). We use robust standard errors in the regression and construct 95% confidence 
intervals (effect size ± 1.96SE, where SE is the standard error for the regression 
coefficient).
3  Results
We start by considering all experiments that meet our inclusion criteria. Figure 1 
displays a forest plot of all experiments, including the overall effect with a corre-
sponding 95% confidence interval. To the right of each estimate, we provide design 
details for the associated experiment.
As Fig. 1 shows, the magnitude of the overall effect of intuition manipulations 
on cooperation is 2.19 percentage points, and this effect is statistically significant 
(p = 0.005, Z test). However, the magnitude of the overall effect is only 35.7% of 
the main effect reported in a prior meta-analysis that excludes non-compliers (Rand 
2016) and only 52.1% the size of the intention-to-treat effect reported in that meta-
analysis. This reduction in effect size may reflect the addition of individual lab 
estimates featured in the large registered replication study by Bouwmeester et  al. 
(2017), which finds no effect of time constraints on cooperation. This pattern, in 
turn, is consistent with the ‘decline effect’ (e.g., Fanelli et  al. 2017), whereby the 
influence in a meta-analysis of publication bias in an initial study dissipates with the 
number of replication studies added with no effect.
The overall effect may nevertheless not capture a psychologically relevant param-
eter; we can attribute 62% of the variation in the above forest plot to systematic 
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differences between experiments (I2 = 61.9%, χ2(81) = 212.75, p < 0.001).7 Moreo-
ver, the estimated between-study variance is large ( ̂𝜏2 = 27.08). As an illustration, 
note that the effect size varies from − 9 percentage points to 32. In summary, the 
Fig. 1  Forest plot, all experiments
7 The estimated heterogeneity is similar to that found in Rand’s (2016) meta-analysis.
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analysis suggests an overall positive effect, but the experiments included exhibit very 
large variation in effect sizes, and that variation may, to a large degree, be attributed 
to factors other than chance.8 As an overall effect size provided by a random-effects 
analysis is insufficient to summarize a heterogeneous set of studies (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 1985), our summary estimate should be interpreted with caution.
When a meta-analysis suggests large between-study variation, it is common prac-
tice to search for the sources of that variation (Higgins et al. 2003a, b). In our case, 
the observed heterogeneity may have several explanations. One possibility is that 
the intuitive cooperation effect is contingent on various background factors, as sug-
gested in several papers (Capraro and Cococcioni 2015; Mischkowski and Glöck-
ner 2016; Rand et al. 2014; Strømland et al. 2016), including Rand’s (2016) meta-
analysis. Another possibility is that various manipulations, here grouped together 
as ‘intuition manipulations’, may work in different ways or even capture distinct 
psychological processes. That is, one may ask whether the observed inconsistency 
across studies is attributable to genuine and perhaps unpredictable variation in the 
underlying effect across study populations, or whether it is a by-product of the inclu-
sion criteria. To distinguish between these possibilities, we turn to an analysis that 
separates manipulation types.
3.1  Comparing manipulations: meta‑regressions
We use meta-regressions (see e.g., Thompson and Higgins 2002) to compare the 
intuitive cooperation effect across manipulation types. We take as a baseline experi-
ments with time pressure, since time pressure is the manipulation type most fre-
quently applied to induce cooperation. In SOM A (see Figures A.1–A.7), we provide 
meta-analyses specific to each manipulation type. In all individual meta-analyses 
but one, there is substantially less systematic between-study variation than there is 
in the overall analysis. The exception is that for induction manipulations (see Fig-
ure A.4), where the estimated heterogeneity is 83.1%—which is very high (Higgins 
et  al. 2003a, b); this indicates that nearly all observed variation is attributable to 
genuine differences in the underlying effect across studies of this type. For this rea-
son, we split induction manipulations into the following subcategories: (i) ‘emotion-
induction’ manipulations instructing participants to rely on emotion over reason 
when making their choices, (ii) ‘recall induction’, and (iii) ‘other induction’ manipu-
lations. The meta-regression results are displayed in Table 1. It is important to note 
that these regressions capture correlations, as we only have within-study randomiza-
tion and no exogenous between-study variation.
The meta-regressions yield several noteworthy results. First, Column (1) shows 
that only experiments using emotion-induction manipulations are significantly more 
effective in promoting cooperation than are time-pressure studies (coefficient = 14.88 
8 The distinction between I2 and 휏2 is important. The former measure answers the question, “What pro-
portion of the observed variation between studies is due to factors other than random chance?”, while the 
second measure answers, “How large is the systematic inconsistency across studies?” (Borenstein et al. 
2017). Thus, in a sufficiently large sample, I2 may be large even in the absence of large between-study 
variation.
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percentage points, t(76) = 7.01, p < 0.001); the other manipulations are not signif-
icantly different from the small and non-significant effect estimated for the time-
pressure studies (coefficient = 0.619, t(76) = 0.80). It is also noteworthy that ‘other 
induction’ manipulations yield an estimated effect very close to that of time-pressure 
studies, a mere 2.57-percentage point difference (t(76) = 0.81). Column (2) takes 
emotion-induction manipulations as the baseline and shows that all other manipula-
tions are significantly less effective in promoting cooperation. Consistent with this, 
in Column (4), both time-pressure (t(79) = − 7.12, p < 0.001) and ‘pooled’ manipu-
lations (t(79) = − 6.01, p < 0.001) are estimated to reduce the effect size by about 
14 percentage points relative to emotion-induction manipulations. Together, these 
results justify our subdivision of the wider class of induction manipulations.
A funnel plot of all studies in the main analysis (see SOM A, Fig. A.11) illus-
trates the relative effectiveness of manipulation types; five out of six experiments 
using the emotion-induction manipulations appear as outliers, to the right of the 
95%-confidence bar.
Table 1  Meta-regressions of effect size (intuitive cooperation effect) on manipulation type
Standard errors in parentheses. (1) Meta-regressions on manipulation type (baseline: time pressure); (2) 
meta-regressions on manipulation type (baseline: emotion induction); (3) meta-regressions on manipula-
tion type, all manipulations that are not emotion induction or time pressure pooled together (baseline: 
time pressure); and (4) meta-regressions on manipulation type, all manipulations that are not emotion 
induction or time pressure pooled together (baseline: emotion induction). ‘Pooled’ is a dummy for all 
manipulations that are not time pressure or emotion induction
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect size Effect size Effect size Effect size
Depletion − 0.177 − 15.06***
(2.567) (3.145)
Cognitive load 0.695 − 14.19***
(3.851) (4.258)
Recall induction 1.142 − 13.74***
(2.043) (2.734)
Emotion induction 14.88*** 14.81***
(2.123) (2.080)
Other induction 2.565 − 12.32***
(3.148) (3.635)
Time pressure − 14.88*** − 14.81***
(2.123) (2.080)
Pooled 0.978 − 13.83***
(1.461) (2.300)
Constant 0.619 15.50*** 0.630 15.44***
(0.777) (1.976) (0.765) (1.934)
Observations 82 82 82 82
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While Rand (2016) suggests that time-pressure manipulations are less effec-
tive than are other manipulations, our results indicate that only emotion-induction 
manipulations differ in their effect from other manipulations. We therefore proceed 
to test whether our overall meta-analytic effect depends on the emotion-induction 
manipulations, specifically; we conduct an alternative meta-analysis that includes 
all studies other than the six experiments using emotion-induction manipulations. 
This meta-analysis (see Fig. A.10) reveals no discernable overall effect on coopera-
tion; the estimated meta-analytic effect is 1 percentage point (p = 0.076, Z test), and, 
judged by conventional classifications (Higgins et al. 2003a, b), heterogeneity is also 
quite low (I2(74) = 19.8%, χ2(75) = 93.50, p = 0.073, 𝜏2  = 4.43). Because time-pres-
sure studies have been called into question, both for the size of their effect (Rand 
2016) and their validity (Myrseth and Wollbrant 2017), we run a meta-analysis that 
excludes all emotion-induction and time-pressure manipulations, evaluating all other 
manipulations in the same test (Fig. A.9). In this meta-analysis, the estimated effect 
of the intuition manipulations is 1.62 percentage points—only 26.4% of the main 
effect reported in Rand (2016) and only 38.6% of that study’s intention-to-treat esti-
mate—and not significantly different from zero (p = 0.177, Z test).
To ensure that our conclusions are not sensitive to inclusion criteria, we under-
take additional robustness checks, using various combinations of Rand’s (2016) 
inclusion criteria while excluding the emotion-induction studies. In all tests, we 
follow Rand and include data on second movers and last-round moves in finitely 
repeated games. We also undertake robustness tests where we include data on trust 
game decisions, and tests where we include second-mover decisions only where the 
first mover contributed the maximum amount possible (as in Rand 2016). We carry 
out these robustness checks both for the specification excluding emotion-induction 
and time-pressure studies (Fig. A.9) and for the specification excluding only the 
emotion-induction studies (Fig. A.10). None of these robustness checks reveal a sta-
tistically significant overall effect; the estimated effect is consistently very small and 
insensitive to the inclusion criteria (see Table A.3 for details). Finally, it is worth 
noting that a separate meta-analysis of pre-registered studies (Bouwmeester et  al. 
2017; Camerer et al. 2018; Everett et al. 2017), only, leads to a similar conclusion; 
the effect size in this meta-analysis is just 0.79 percentage points and not statistically 
significant, and the estimated heterogeneity is low (see Fig. A.12).
A possible interpretation of our null result is that the ‘true’ effect size is very 
small, and that our result, when excluding emotion-induction manipulations, is a 
false negative. However, this interpretation would prove equally challenging to exist-
ing studies that report evidence for intuitive cooperation. Suppose that our upper 
bound on the effect size—1.8 percentage points in these eight specifications—rep-
resents the true effect size. Then, for a single study to have 80% power to detect 
the underlying effect, one would need a sample size of at least 15,486 participants 
(assuming a common standard deviation of 40 between treatment groups). Should 
the effect size instead be 1 percentage point, as in Fig A.10—which also corre-
sponds closely to the effect size obtained using only pre-registered studies (see Fig. 
A.12)—one would need a sample size of at least 50,176 participants for a single 
study to achieve 80% power. Thus, even if our main finding were a false negative, 
the mean effect size in this literature is so small that to meaningfully study it one 
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would need sample sizes an order of magnitude larger than those typically used in 
experimental studies. Any statistically ‘positive’ finding in this literature, obtained 
in typical sample sizes, would therefore likely represent a major overestimate (Gel-
man and Carlin 2014).
3.2  Alternative explanations
Rand (2019) responds to a pre-print version of our analysis by undertaking his own 
updated meta-analysis. He uses a combination of the data from Rand (2016) and 
those from our paper. His main argument is that our choice to exclude sequential 
games from the main analysis is responsible for the null effect obtained when we 
exclude emotion-induction manipulations. However, this cannot be the reason for 
the discrepancies between his new findings and ours—Table A.3 in our supplemen-
tary materials shows that our results are insensitive to the differences in inclusion 
criteria between Rand (2016) and our study.
Rand (2019) argues further that poor experimental designs may account for why 
there are many null findings in the literature. He suggests that future studies should 
move towards experimental designs that increase the compliance rate and compre-
hension of the game, and he expects these design features to be associated with sub-
stantially larger treatment effects. Related to the latter point, we note that the regis-
tered replication report by Bouwmeester et al. (2017) undertook a high-powered test 
of the hypothesis that comprehension moderates the time-pressure effect; they found 
no time-pressure effect in the comprehending subgroup. As for the hypothesis that 
greater compliance is associated with greater effect size, we are not aware of prior 
tests in the literature, so we undertake it here. Because compliance varies between 
manipulation types, we also undertake a separate test for studies using time-pressure 
manipulations. Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of compliance rate and effect size, for 
all studies included in our meta-analysis.
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As Fig.  2 shows, there is no obvious relationship between the compliance rate 
of the study and the observed effect size, neither in general for all manipulations 
nor specifically for the time-pressure manipulations. The correlation is estimated in 
a meta-regression to be small and positive, but not statistically significant, neither 
for the full sample nor for the sample of time-pressure studies (regression results in 
Table A.4). Based on evidence available, therefore, it seems unlikely that a move-
ment towards studies with higher compliance rates will have a major impact on 
effect sizes in this literature.
An alternative way of addressing the role of study compliance is to run the meta-
analysis for compliant participants only (so that the effect size is computed for each 
study only for participants who complied with the time allotted), as the main analy-
sis in Rand (2016) was conducted. We report such an analysis in Fig. A.13, where 
we run the meta-analysis for all studies, including compliant participants only. This 
analysis yields a positive and statistically significant association between the intui-
tion manipulations and cooperation, even when excluding emotion-induction manip-
ulations. However, conditioning on compliance status amounts to a ‘bad control 
problem’, as the treatment effect conditional on potentially endogenous variables 
warrants causal interpretation only under quite restrictive assumptions (Montgom-
ery et al. 2018). Specifically, the analysis assumes that compliance, which happens 
after randomization, does not affect systematically the relative distribution of par-
ticipants in the treatment versus control groups. This assumption is unmerited, how-
ever, as conditioning on compliance may plausibly change the composition in the 
treatment versus control groups differentially, such that these groups no longer are 
directly comparable. And, as seen in Table A.1, there is empirical evidence for the 
selection-bias argument—data sets in this literature indicate that there is self-selec-
tion into who complies or fails to comply with the treatment assigned. Finally, we 
would also note that absence of imbalance would not in itself amount to evidence 
against the selection-bias argument, as balance tests do not have 100% statistical 
power—and not all factors imbalanced between treatments are measured. In choos-
ing to include non-compliant participants in our main analysis, we also follow recent 
meta-analyses in this literature (Fromell et al. 2018; Köbis et al. 2019; Rand 2019).
4  Conclusion
We present an updated meta-analysis of experiments that attempt to manipulate 
intuitive decision-making processes in games of cooperation. Our analysis tests the 
Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH), which stipulates that intuitive decision-mak-
ing processes facilitate cooperative behavior. In examining both the overall meta-
analytic effect and the origin of the between-study heterogeneity, we fail to obtain 
robust evidence for the SHH. Although we find evidence in favor of an overall posi-
tive effect of intuitive decision processes on cooperation, we can attribute this effect 
to a particular class of emotion-induction manipulations—those asking participants 
to rely on emotion over reason when determining allocation. Other manipulation 
types fail to yield a statistically discernable effect on cooperation. When we exclude 
the six studies with this manipulation type and conduct a meta-analysis on the 
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remaining 76 studies, which comprise 93% of the observations in our full data set, 
we find that intuition manipulations have no effect on cooperation.
The consistency in findings across all manipulation types, save the emotion-
induction manipulations, suggests that the latter produces a distinct effect. One pos-
sibility is that the transparency of the researchers’ intention in this setting—asking 
people to rely on emotion over reason—is understood as a request that participants 
cooperate, akin to an experimenter demand effect. A request to use your ‘heart’ 
could be seen as encouragement to be ‘nice’, whereas a request to use your ‘brain’ 
may indicate that you should try to calculate personal consequences (and not be gul-
lible). The demand effect is less likely to apply to the other intuition manipulations 
(e.g., time pressure) as the link in those cases, between the researcher’s hypothesis 
of interest and the treatment, is less transparent. While a laboratory participant asked 
to decide within 10 s might suspect that the study is about the relationship between 
cooperation and making decisions fast or slow, the direction of the research hypoth-
esis is not evident. Notably, direct requests that signal strongly potential underlying 
research objectives have been shown to strengthen experimenter demand effects (de 
Quidt et al. 2018).
An alternative, but perhaps less plausible possibility is that emotion induction is 
the only class of manipulations that successfully influences intuitive decision mak-
ing. However, even if this alternative interpretation were true, it is worth noting that 
the SHH (Rand et al. 2014; Bear and Rand 2016) did not give reason a priori that 
this manipulation should work, whereas others should not. Related to this, one might 
wonder whether failure to comply with experimental instructions could account for 
our results, as compliance varies with study type. However, we do not find evidence 
for the hypothesis, put forward by Rand (2019), that studies with higher compliance 
exhibit higher effect sizes.
We also fail to find support for the idea that the underlying effect is highly het-
erogeneous (Rand 2016), as the removal of emotion-induction experiments from 
the meta-analysis reduces estimated between-study heterogeneity dramatically. This 
finding is consistent with the low between-study variation observed in the meta-
analysis by Fromell et al. (2018), who study the effect of intuition manipulations on 
dictator game giving. We cannot rule out the possibility that we are underpowered 
to detect study-level heterogeneity, but it does appear that the meta-study by Rand 
(2016) overstates the importance of study-level heterogeneity for the effect of intui-
tion manipulations. Nevertheless, tests for heterogeneity between studies will not 
necessarily pick up genuine individual-level heterogeneity, if such individual char-
acteristics tend to be similar across study populations, and some studies argue that 
such individual-level heterogeneity is important for the link between intuition and 
cooperation (e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani 2018). One recent study on time-pres-
sure effects in the dictator game tests more directly for such individual-level hetero-
geneity (across a large set of potentially relevant variables) and finds little evidence 
for it (Strømland and Torsvik 2019).
As our study focuses on cooperation, we cannot rule out that intuition influences 
other forms of pro-social behavior. According to Rand et al. (2016), the SHH also 
predicts intuitive altruism in women, but not men. While their meta-analysis finds 
support for this prediction, a more recent meta-analysis by Fromell et  al. (2018) 
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finds for men a negative effect of intuitive decision processes on altruism and for 
women no effect.
At a more general level, our findings also speak to the current discussion on het-
erogeneity in effect sizes in psychology and economics (DellaVigna and Pope 2018; 
Klein et al. 2014; McShane and Böckenholt 2014; van Aert et al. 2016). Meta-anal-
yses in psychology typically suggest substantial systematic heterogeneity in effect 
size (Stanley et  al. 2018), but the recent ‘Many Labs’ projects find relatively low 
systematic variation in effect size across various contexts and cultures (Klein et al. 
2014, 2018). Consistent with this, studies by DellaVigna and Pope (2018) indicate 
that effect sizes tend to be more stable across settings than predicted by expert fore-
casts. Our meta-analysis is consistent with these findings, and it shows that esti-
mated treatment effect heterogeneity in meta-analyses can be surprisingly sensitive 
to inclusion criteria; when we include the emotion-induction manipulations, hetero-
geneity is high—but when we exclude them, heterogeneity is low. Our evidence thus 
highlights the possibility that some of the heterogeneity reported in meta-analyses 
arises from researchers’ inclusion decisions—as opposed to genuine variation in the 
effects under scrutiny.
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